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Abstract—Using a unique, randomized information experiment embedded
in a survey, this paper investigates how consumers’ inflation expectations
respond to new information. We find that respondents, on average, update
their expectations in response to (certain types of) information, and do so
sensibly, in a manner consistent with Bayesian updating. As a result of
information provision, the distribution of inflation expectations converges
toward its center and cross-sectional disagreement declines. We docu-
ment heterogeneous information processing by gender and present sug-
gestive evidence of respondents forecasting under asymmetric loss. Our
results provide support for expectation-formation models in which agents
form expectations rationally but face information constraints.
A fuller understanding of the public’s learning rules would
improve the central bank’s capacity to assess its own credibil-
ity, to evaluate the implications of its policy decisions and
communications strategy, and perhaps to forecast inflation.
Ben Bernanke (2007)
I. Introduction
MANY economic decisions—consumption, saving,wage bargaining, investing—are believed to be influ-
enced by expectations about inflation. Inflation expectations
have now become central to macroeconomic models and
monetary policy (Gali, 2008; Sims, 2009), and managing
consumers’ inflation expectations has become one of the
main goals of policymakers.1 Indeed, national surveys of
public inflation expectations are now conducted in multiple
countries.2 However, managing inflation expectations
requires not just monitoring expectations but also under-
standing how these expectations are formed.
Studies based on survey data have shown substantial
divergence among individuals’ beliefs about future inflation
(Mankiw, Reis, & Wolfers, 2003), which the recent litera-
ture attempts to explain as a result of different information
sets or different expectation-formation processes—for
example, sticky information models, in which new informa-
tion is slow to diffuse through the population (Mankiw &
Reis, 2002), perhaps because agents only probabilistically
pay attention to experts or to news (Carroll, 2003); noisy
information models, in which agents form expectations
based on noisy private signals (Woodford, 2001); some form
of adaptive learning (Evans & Honkapohja, 2001); switch-
ing between different prediction rules (Branch, 2004); learn-
ing from lifetime inflation experiences (Malmendier &
Nagel, 2016; Madeira & Zafar, 2012); or heterogeneous
asymmetric costs for over- and underestimates of inflation
(Capistran & Timmermann, 2009). However, while this lit-
erature has found some aggregate data patterns consistent
with these models, there nevertheless remains little direct
empirical evidence on how individual consumers form their
inflation expectations. This paper helps fill that gap.
We conduct an experiment in which we randomly pro-
vide a subset of survey respondents with information
(which we refer to as ‘‘treatment information’’) about either
past-year average food price inflation (food treatment) or
the average forecast of next-year overall inflation in the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF treatment). Before
this subset of respondents receives this information, and
again after this subset receives this information, we ask all
respondents for their expectations of future inflation. This
experimental design thus creates a unique panel data set
that allows us to observe how this new information induces
respondents to update their inflation expectations.
We also ask all respondents for their priors about the ran-
domly provided information (referred to as ‘‘information
priors’’) and test whether respondents’ ex ante informedness
can help explain baseline heterogeneity of expectations for
future inflation and updating of these expectations after the
information is revealed. We expect respondents who are less
informed about either of the information treatments ex ante
(those who exhibit larger gaps on average between their
information priors and the treatment information) to have
more extreme baseline expectations for future inflation. For
these respondents, the information treatment may contain
more valuable information that causes expectations updat-
ing and may thus result in larger expectation revisions. The
patterns in who updates—and how much they do so—shed
light on how expectations are formed and how consumers
react to (possibly) inflation-relevant new information.
Compared to existing studies, the approach used in this
paper differs in that we (a) can remain agnostic about each
respondent’s information set, (b) explain the heterogeneity
of expectations without imposing any particular learning
rule or information-processing rule for consumers, and (c)
Received for publication January 18, 2013. Revision accepted for publi-
cation July 11, 2014. Editor: Philippe Aghion.
* Armantier, Topa, van der Klaauw, and Zafar: Federal Reserve Bank
of New York; Nelson: MIT.
We thank Carlos Madeira, Ricardo Reis, and participants at presenta-
tions at the NY Fed Brown Bag Lunch, State Bank of Pakistan, and
CIPREE Conference on Formation and Revision of Subjective Expecta-
tions for comments. S.N. gratefully acknowledges support from a
National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under grant
number 1122374. The views expressed are our own and do not necessa-
rily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal
Reserve System. All errors that remain are ours.
A supplemental appendix is available online at http://www.mitpress
journals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00499.
1 Bernanke (2004), argues that ‘‘an essential prerequisite for controlling
inflation is controlling inflation expectations.’’
2 These include the Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of Consum-
ers, the Livingston Survey, the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence
Survey, and the Survey of Professional Forecasters in the United States.
Other central banks that survey consumers about their inflation expecta-
tions include the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank
of Japan, the Reserve Bank of India, and the Sveriges Riksbank.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, July 2016, 98(3): 503–523
 2016 Federal Reserve Bank of New York
doi:10.1162/REST_a_00499
infer the causal effects of different types of inflation-
relevant information on individual consumers. Previous stu-
dies have mostly overlooked the panel dimension of survey
expectations (see Keane & Runkle, 1990, for an exception)
and instead have studied the aggregate evolution of beliefs
in repeated cross-sections; this complicates the interpreta-
tion of previous work on learning in expectation updating.
Exploiting our information treatment, we find that new
information in the SPF treatment, but not food treatment,
indeed causes respondents to update their inflation expecta-
tions, and to do so in a sensible manner. On average, we
find that respondents (a) revise their inflation expectations
down if their information priors were overestimates (and
vice versa for underestimates), (b) revise their expectations
more when the amount by which they over- or underesti-
mate is larger, and (c) are more receptive to the information
when the uncertainty in their baseline inflation expectations
is greater. Although we cannot test whether respondents are
rational (Bayesian) updaters, we note that these three results
are consistent with Bayesian updating.
A necessary condition for our information intervention to
have an effect is, of course, that respondents are not ex ante
fully informed about the true values of the quantities about
which information is revealed. That is in fact what we find:
treatment respondents in the SPF treatment and food treat-
ment overestimate the objective information (i.e., the pro-
fessionals’ average forecast of year-ahead inflation for the
SPF treatment, and past changes in food and beverage
prices in the Food treatment) by an average of 3.61 and
7.15 percentage points, respectively. These are substantial
gaps in informedness: past food and beverage price changes
had not been as high as the average respondent believed
since 1981, and the average SPF forecast had not been as
high as believed since 1982.3
Looking beyond average effects, we find important
heterogeneity in respondents’ informedness about our
treatment information in general and in their subsequent
responsiveness to this information. Certain demographic
groups—female, lower-income, and less-educated respon-
dents, as well as those with less financial literacy—gener-
ally have larger perception gaps (the gap between the treat-
ment information and respondents’ information priors). It is
well documented that these same demographic groups tend
to have higher expectations for future inflation than their
counterparts do,4 contributing to the strong right skew of
the inflation expectations distribution. Thus, we offer an
alternative novel explanation for the systematically high
inflation expectations of these demographic groups by iden-
tifying a relative gap in their own information sets about
objective inflation measures.
We find that our information treatment leads to a signifi-
cant decline in the cross-sectional disagreement of inflation
expectations and causes the distribution of inflation ex-
pectations for the overall sample as well as for each
demographic group—particularly those with high baseline
expectations and lower ex ante informedness—to converge
toward its center. In fact, average revised expectations are
nearer to actual realized CPI inflation as a result of our
intervention. This is an encouraging result: it suggests that
policymakers could partially control the high-expectation
right tail of the inflation expectations distribution through
public information campaigns in the spirit of our informa-
tion treatments. However, a number of respondents, even
some with high perception gaps, do not revise their expecta-
tions at all. While our results shed some light on these non-
revisers—they tend to have smaller perception gaps (and
hence the treatments have less informational content for
them) and are more likely to be men—we are not able to
completely predict nonrevisions based on demographics or
perception gaps. Thus, we must conclude that some respon-
dents either do not find the provided information relevant
for inflation expectations or do not find the information
credible. This suggests that any public information cam-
paigns to help anchor consumer inflation expectations need
to be carefully designed and multipronged.
Our results have implications for the modeling of consu-
mer inflation expectations. We can reject full-information
rational expectations (as in Muth, 1961) because we find
that the provision of readily available public information
has systematic effects on respondents’ updating. Neverthe-
less, our results lend support to newer models of expecta-
tion formation in which individuals still form expectations
rationally but do so subject to information constraints
(Sims, 2003; Reis, 2006a, 2006b; Coibion & Gorodni-
chenko, 2012a). At a general level, the facts that respon-
dents’ updating behavior is in the direction of our experi-
mentally provided information signal, proportional to the
strength of the signal, and greater when the baseline expec-
tations are more uncertain suggest that updating behavior is
consistent with rational, Bayesian updating. More particu-
larly, the patterns we observe in cross-sectional disagree-
ment about inflation expectations suggest that consumers’
information constraints may be better represented by sticky
information models (as in Mankiw & Reis, 2002, or Carroll,
2003) than by noisy information models.
We also find evidence of heterogeneous updating by gen-
der (controlling for the information content of the signal
and uncertainty of baseline expectations), indicative of het-
erogeneous information-processing rules by gender. This
suggests that both the realism and the performance of mod-
els of inflation expectations could be improved by allowing
for heterogeneous use of (private and public) information.
Finally, since we gather both point-forecast and density-
forecast inflation expectations from all respondents, we are
3 This finding is generally consistent with a literature that shows indivi-
duals can be uninformed when making decisions of economic signifi-
cance: low-income families are unaware of basic features of the earned
income tax credit (Chetty & Saez, 2013); students have incorrect percep-
tions of returns to schooling (Jensen, 2010; Wiswall & Zafar, 2015); most
households are unaware of their marginal price for electricity and water
(Brown, Hoffman, & Baxter, 1975; Carter & Milon, 2005).
4 See Jonung (1981), Bryan and Venkatu (2001a, 2001b), Lombardelli
and Saleheen (2003), and Bruine de Bruin, van der Klaauw, et al. (2010).
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able to test whether respondents provide point forecasts
under symmetric or asymmetric loss (Capistran & Timmer-
mann, 2009). We present suggestive evidence of respon-
dents’ expectations being consistent with forecasting under
asymmetric loss. As we discuss, this implies that measuring
and accounting for individuals’ uncertainty may be crucial
when calibrating models to survey data, especially if there
is reason to believe that individuals’ uncertainty may be
changing over time.
This paper is organized as follows. The survey design
and data collection methodology are described in section II.
Section III summarizes the data and analyzes the revision
of inflation expectations. Demographic heterogeneity in
expectations and updating is analyzed in section IV. We
discuss the implications of our results for the modeling of
consumer inflation expectations in section V and conclude
with a discussion of the policy implications of our study
and its limitations in section VI.
II. Data
Our data are from an original survey that is part of an
ongoing effort by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.5
The survey was conducted over the Internet with RAND’s
American Life Panel (ALP). Our target population consists
of individuals 18 or older who participated in the Reuters/
University of Michigan Survey of Consumers between
November 2006 and July 2010 and subsequently agreed to
participate in the ALP.6 Out of a total sample of 771 indivi-
duals invited to participate in the survey, 735 did so, imply-
ing a response rate of 95.3%. The survey was fielded
between January 3, 2011, and February 9, 2011. Respon-
dents received $20 for each completed survey.
A. Survey Design
The survey consisted of two sets of questions. The first set
of questions, analyzed in Armantier et al. (2013), examines
the link between self-reported beliefs and economic beha-
vior. The second set of questions—the focus of this paper—
investigates how individuals revise their inflation expecta-
tions after being exposed to new information.
We introduce notation here that we will use throughout
the paper to refer to our survey-measured quantities of
interest. As diagrammed in figure 1, these quantities were
measured in four survey stages.
Stage 1: Baseline inflation expectations. In the first
stage, respondents were randomly assigned to one of two
questions that elicited their baseline expectations for future
inflation, either for their own consumption basket (the
‘‘prices you pay,’’ hereafter PP) or for the economy overall
(the ‘‘rate of inflation,’’ hereafter RI). The PP question
asked the respondent for ‘‘your expectations for the prices
of things you usually spend money on going into the
future,’’ whereas the RI question asked for ‘‘your expecta-
tions for the rate of inflation/deflation going into the
future.’’ We refer to these measured quantities as baseline
inflation expectations.
The inflation expectation questions were asked for two
different horizons: (a) a point forecast ‘‘over the next 12
months,’’ which corresponds to the period January 2011
and January 2012, and (b) a point forecast ‘‘over the one-
year period between January 2013 and January 2014,’’
which at the time of the survey was three-year-ahead one-
year inflation.
In addition, we asked respondents for their density fore-
cast over the next twelve months: here respondents assigned
probabilities to possible future inflation outcomes such as
‘‘the rate of deflation will be between 0% and 2%’’ or ‘‘the
rate of inflation will be 12% or more.’’ These inflation out-
come intervals were mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive, and respondents could verify that their assigned
probabilities summed to 100%.
The PP question is similar to the one used in the Univer-
sity of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers, which produces
the often-cited monthly measure of consumer inflation
expectations. Prior research shows that the Michigan Sur-
vey’s question text induces mixed interpretations, with
some respondents thinking about specific prices they pay
and others thinking about the overall rate of inflation
(Bruine de Bruin, van der Klaauw, et al., 2011). Therefore,
the RI question is our preferred way of eliciting respon-
dents’ inflation expectations, and in this paper we focus on
responses to the RI question. In the analysis, we will use pi
to refer to individual i’s (RI) baseline inflation expectation.
For a detailed analysis of PP responses, we refer readers to
the working version of this paper: Armantier, Nelson, et al.
(2013).
Stage 2: Information priors. In the second stage,
respondents were randomly assigned to one of two ques-
tions that measured their ex ante informedness about (pos-
sibly) inflation-relevant information.
 In the food treatment, respondents were asked, ‘‘Over
the last twelve months, by how much do you think the
average prices of food and beverages in the US have
changed?’’
 In the survey of professional forecasters treatment,
respondents were asked, ‘‘A group of professional
economists report their expectations of future inflation
on a regular basis. What do you think these profes-
5 The general goal of this initiative is to develop better tools to measure
consumers’ inflation expectations, study the link between expectations
and behavior (Armantier, Nelson, et al., 2013), and better understand how
the public forms and updates expectations about future inflation (Bruine
de Bruin, Potter, et al., 2010).
6 The Michigan survey is a monthly telephone survey with 500 respon-
dents, consisting of a representative list assisted random-digit-dial sample
of 300, and 200 respondents who were re-interviewed from the random-
digit-dial sample surveyed six months earlier. Our target population is
further restricted to active ALP members, defined as those who either par-
ticipated in at least one ALP survey within the preceding year or were
recruited into the ALP within the past year.
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sional economists predicted inflation to be over the
next twelve months?’’
In both cases, respondents are asked for a point estimate
of year-over-year percentage change. We refer to respon-
dents’ beliefs as their information priors, which we denote
for each consumer i as either xi;Food or xi;SPF (where SPF is
for ‘‘survey of professional forecasters’’).
Between stages 1 and 2, respondents participated in a
battery of experimental questions related to inflation and
investment (discussed in Armantier et al., 2015), and also
answered several questions about consumption behavior
and sources of information about inflation/prices.
Stage 3: Treatment information. In the third stage,
immediately after reporting their information priors, 75%
of respondents were randomly provided with true measures,
defined as those published in publicly available data series,
for which their information prior was elicited in stage 2.
We refer to these quantities as treatment information, repre-
sented as xFood and x

SPF. The 75% of respondents who
received the objective information are referred to as the
treatment group.
For the food treatment, we used the series of average
food and beverage prices for urban U.S. consumers that is
produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Treated respon-
dents saw the following information: ‘‘According to the
most recent data available from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, the average prices of food and beverages in the US
INCREASED by 1.39% over the last twelve months.’’
Thus, xFood ¼ 1:39.
For the SPF treatment, we used the average forecast of
next-year Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation from the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s quarterly Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters (SPF). Respondents in this treatment
saw the following information: ‘‘The Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) is a quarterly survey of professional econo-
mists. According to the latest data, these professional econo-
mists expect, on average, inflation to be 1.96% over the next
twelve months. Not all of these professional economists agree
about future inflation though. However, most (90%) of them
expect inflation over the next twelve months to be between
1.19%and 3.03%.’’ Thus,xSPF  1:96.
Also in the third stage, the remaining 25% of respondents
were given no treatment information. In the analysis, we
refer to these respondents as the control group. The simple
act of taking a survey about inflation expectations (including
FIGURE 1.—SURVEY DESIGN
506 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
receiving our questions in stage 2) may make respondents
think more carefully about their responses and may lead
them to revise their expectations even if they are not pro-
vided with any new information (see Zwane et al., 2011, for
a discussion of how surveying people may change their sub-
sequent behavior). Since we are interested in revisions in
expectations that are directly attributable to the information,
we identify that off of differences between the treatment
groups’ and control groups’ changes in expectations.7
Stage 4: Final inflation expectations. In the final stage,
inflation expectations were reelicited from all respondents,
with each respondent being asked the same inflation question
they were asked in the first stage. We refer to these expecta-




Among our 735 respondents, 705 finished the survey, of
whom 653 gave answers for the minimum set of questions
needed for our analysis—that is, answers for information
priors, as well as both baseline and final inflation expecta-
tions for at least the one-year-ahead point forecast inflation
questions. We additionally exclude from our analysis eigh-
teen respondents with unusually high (greater than 50 per-
centage points) information priors (about Food or about the
SPF forecast) or baseline inflation expectations. Thus, we
are left with a total sample of 635 respondents. Since we
focus on the RI question in this paper, we limit our analysis
to the 325 respondents assigned the RI question. For a
detailed analysis of PP responses, we refer readers to the
working version of this paper, Armantier, Nelson, et al.
(2013), where we show that our main results also hold in the
PP sample, although interestingly and intuitively, the more
significant PP updating behavior occurs in the Food treat-
ment. Table 1 shows resulting sample sizes for each of the
four treatment cells and corresponding control cells.
For these 325 respondents, the average age is 52.5 years
(standard deviation ¼ 14.0), with 42.8% being men, 86.8%
non-Hispanic white, and 4.9% non-Hispanic black. The
median annual family income is reported as $50,000 to
$59,999, and 81.8% of respondents have an annual family
income of $30,000 or more. Respondents hail from 46 dif-
ferent U.S. states, and 50.5% have a four-year college
degree. Hence our sample has higher median income and
higher educational attainment, and also has more white
respondents, than the U.S. population overall.
For the analysis, we define a respondent to be high
income if the annual household income is at least $75,000;
39.2% of the sample falls in this group. We define a respon-
dent to be older if the respondent is at least 55 years of age;
46.8% of the sample falls in this group.
We paid respondents a fixed compensation for complet-
ing the survey and did not elicit respondents’ inflation
expectations or information priors using a financially incen-
tivized instrument such as a scoring rule. This is because
proper scoring rules may generate biases when respondents
are not risk neutral (Winkler & Murphy, 1970). Moreover,
incentivized belief elicitation techniques are not incentive
compatible when the respondent has a stake in the event
that they are predicting (Karni & Safra, 1995), which is the
case for inflation expectations. In addition, Armantier and
Treich (2013) show that elicited beliefs are less biased (but
noisier) in the absence of incentives.
We now move to the empirical analysis. Our analysis has
two main parts. In the next section, we characterize whether
and how our information treatments cause respondents to
update their inflation expectations. In section IV, we exam-
ine the cross-sectional and demographic dispersion of infla-
tion expectations; as possible explanations for that disper-
sion, we analyze demographic differences in both ex ante
informedness and responsiveness to new information.
III. Impact of Information on Inflation
Expectations’ Revisions
In general, we expect our information intervention to
cause individuals to update their inflation expectations if (a)
individuals’ inflation expectations are influenced by their
beliefs about the measures we use in our information treat-
ments (i.e., food and beverage prices or professional fore-
casters’ forecasts), (b) respondents find the provided infor-
TABLE 1.—AVERAGE PRIORS AND REVISIONS BY TREATMENT FOR
ONE-YEAR POINT FORECAST
Control Group Treatment Group
SPF forecast treatment
Number of observations 40 138
Baseline expectationa 5.42 [3.00] 5.42 [3.00]
Perception gapb 3.84 [2.04] 3.61 [1.04]
Revision (Final  baseline)c 0.93 [0] 1.96 [0]
Absolute revision 2.02 [0.38] 2.44 [1]
% nonrevisiond 47.50% 42.03%
Perception gap | Revisee 2.75 [2.04] 4.82 [2.04]
Perception gap | Nonrevise 5.04 [1.04] 1.95þþ [1.04þ]
Food treatment
Number of observations 41 106
Baseline expectation 4.77 [3.00] 6.14 [3.00]
Perception gap 5.27 [3.61] 7.15 [3.61]
Revision (Final  baseline) 0.73 [0] 1.5 [0]
Absolute revision 1.15 [0] 2.58 [0]
% nonrevision 63.41% 52.83%
Perception gap | Revise 4.94 [3.61] 7.65 [5.11]
Perception gap | Nonrevise 5.46 [3.61] 6.70 [3.61]
T-test reported for equality of mean revisions in the control and treatment groups; Median test for
equality of medians; chi-square test for equality of proportions. Significant at *10, **5, ***1%. Tests
conducted for equality of mean and median perception gap for Revise and Nonrevise within each group.
þ, þþ, þþþ denote differences significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
aThe mean (median) inflation expectation reported in the first stage.
bMean (median) perception gap, defined as: ‘‘true’’ treatment info  ‘‘subjective’’ information prior.
cMean (median) revision of inflation expectations.
dProportion of respondents who do not revise their inflation expectations.
eMean (median) perception gap for respondents who revise their inflation expectations.
7 Thus after the stage 3 random assignment, we have four treatment
cells—RI  Food (respondents who report RI inflation expectations and
receive the Food treatment), PP  Food, RI  SPF, and PP  SPF, each
comprising 50%  50%  75% ¼ 18.75% of the total sample—and four
corresponding control groups, each comprising 50%  50%  25% ¼
6.25% of the total sample.
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mation to be credible, and (c) respondents are not already
fully informed about the true values of these quantities.
A key ingredient in our analysis is a measure of respon-
dents’ ex ante informedness about the treatment informa-
tion. The measure we use is the gap between the subjective
information prior (xi) and the true treatment information
(x). We refer to this difference as a perception gap Dxi
for respondent i. We sign perception gaps such that nega-
tive perception gaps indicate overestimation (treatment
information minus information prior), that is, Dxi;SPF 
xSPF  xi;SPF, and Dxi;Food  xFood  xi;Food.
A second key ingredient in our analysis is a measure of
respondents’ baseline uncertainty about future inflation out-
comes. This is generated from respondents’ answers to the
density forecast questions described in section IIA. Follow-
ing the approach developed by Engelberg, Manski, and
Williams (2009), we fit a generalized beta distribution to
each respondent’s stated probabilistic beliefs (see also
Bruine de Bruin, Manski, et al., 2011). We then generate
the variance of the respondent’s beta distribution, which we
take to be a proxy for respondents’ uncertainty about future
inflation outcomes.
We preview and summarize aspects of our data relevant
for characterizing updating behavior and then analyze
updating behavior more formally, beginning with a non-
parametric analysis and then estimating a linear model of
updating.
A. Data Preview and Summary
Baseline expectations and perception gaps. The two
panels of table 1 report key summary statistics for respon-
dents assigned to the SPF treatment and Food treatment,
respectively. In the first row of each panel, we see that the
median baseline inflation expectation for respondents in the
four possible groups (control or treatment, interacted with
the information type) is 3%. Mean baseline inflation expec-
tations for the four groups are higher, ranging between 4.8%
and 6.1%. Indicative of successful randomization across the
groups, the table shows that baseline inflation expectations
are comparable for the treatment and control groups.
The perception gap—our measure of respondents’ ex-
ante informedness about the treatment information—is
shown in the second row in each panel of table 1. The top
panel shows that the mean perception gap for the treatment
group in the SPF treatment is 3.61, that is, an average
overestimate of 3.61 percentage points for professionals’
average forecast of year-ahead inflation.8 Meanwhile, the
mean perception gap for the treatment group in the Food
treatment is an overestimate of 7.15 percentage points. The
presence of large, nonzero perception gaps indicates that a
necessary condition for our information intervention to
have an impact—that some respondents be ex ante unin-
formed about the true values of these quantities—is satis-
fied in our sample. As should be the case, the mean (and
median) perception gaps are comparable for the treatment
and control groups.
It is notable that mean and median perception gaps are
larger for the food treatment. There are several possible
explanations for this. First, when respondents are asked
about past changes in food and beverage prices, their
responses are likely to suffer from memory bias, as respon-
dents are likely to recall items for which perceived price
changes were most extreme (Bruine de Bruin, van der
Klaauw et al., 2011). Second, frequency bias may lead
respondents to report food inflation perceptions based on
the frequency of purchase rather than the total dollar expen-
ditures. Given that prices of frequently purchased items
inflate faster, this would bias their perceptions upward
(Georganas, Healy, & Li, 2014).
Revisions. The third and fourth rows in each panel of
table 1 show various statistics related to the revisions in
inflation expectations. We see that (a) median revisions are
0, while average revisions are downward; (b) average abso-
lute revisions are larger, reflecting a combination of both
upward and downward revisions in our sample; and (c)
average revisions are larger in the treatment groups than in
the control groups. For example, in the Food treatment, the
mean revision is 1.5 for the treatment group and 0.73
for the control group.9 The larger revisions for the treatment
groups suggest that the treatments had a causal impact on
revisions of inflation expectations. However, we see that
none of the differences in revisions (between the control
and treatment groups) is statistically significant, arguably
because of the small sample sizes in the control groups. In
the regression analysis below, we control for the size of
respondents’ perception gaps, which uses richer data than
simply testing for average differences between groups.
As shown in the fifth row of each panel, a sizable propor-
tion of respondents in both the treatment and control groups
do not revise their expectations. Although the proportion of
respondents who do not revise their expectations is smaller
in the treatment groups (as one would expect), nevertheless
many treated respondents (between 42% and 53%) do not
revise their expectations.
If our information is effective in causing respondents to
revise their inflation expectations, then for the treatment
8 Note that in the SPF treatment, respondents were also informed about
the interval containing the forecasts of 90% of the professional econo-
mists: 1.19% to 3.03%. If we instead measure the SPF forecast perception
gap as the minimum (signed) distance between a respondent’s prior and
this interval, then the median perception gap in the SPF treatment is 0.
However, all regression results below are qualitatively similar when we
use this alternative perception gap.
9 After reeliciting inflation expectations, we asked all respondents for a
brief description of why they did or did not update. These free-response
answers help us understand nonzero revisions in the control group. For
example, one control group respondent wrote, ‘‘As I was completing the
questions, I began understanding more of what inflation actually meant.’’
Other control group respondents had responses such as, ‘‘Why would I
have changed my mind in 10 minutes?’’
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groups, we should expect individuals who are ex ante more
uninformed (that is, have larger perception gaps) to be more
likely to revise. That is, on average, perception gaps should
be larger for respondents who revise their beliefs. No such
relationship should be expected for the control groups, since
the treatment information is never revealed to those respon-
dents. The last two rows in each panel of table 1 show that
is in fact the case. The average as well as median perception
gap for respondents who revise their beliefs in the treatment
groups is substantially larger than for those who do not
(though the differences are not always statistically signifi-
cant, arguably because of the substantial heterogeneity in
underlying perception gaps). For example, the average SPF
treatment perception gap for respondents who revise their
expectations is 4.82 percentage points versus 1.95 per-
centage points for those who do not (difference statistically
significant at 5%). And as we expected, there is no such
relationship for the control group; in fact, the average per-
ception gap is larger for nonrevisers in both treatments.
This suggests that the observed revisions for the treatment
group are due to the provided information. We investigate
this in more detail below.
B. Updating of Inflation Expectations
Nonparametric analysis of updating behavior. We start
with a nonparametric analysis of observed updating beha-
vior. If a respondent finds the treatment information rele-
vant and credible and uses the treatment information sensi-
bly to update her inflation expectations, then we expect to
see an under(over)estimation of treatment information lead-
ing to an upward (downward) revision in inflation expecta-
tions.10 For our purposes, underestimations are signed as
positive perception gaps. Therefore, inflation expectations’
revisions should be positively related to the perception gap.
Figure 2 plots perception gaps and revisions separately
for each treatment and control group. More precisely, the
figure shows the mean revision by perception gap decile,11
as well as a local linear regression of mean revisions on per-
ception gaps. Data consistent with sensible updating beha-
vior in response to the treatment information should have
the following characteristics: the data points should be in
either quadrants 1 or 3 (the two shaded quadrants in the fig-
ure), that is, mean revisions should be positive for positive
perception gaps and negative for negative perception gaps;
and there should be a positive relationship between mean
revisions and perception gaps, that is, the spline should be
upward sloping in quadrants 1 and 3. Comparing the two
graphs in the first column of figure 2 (treatment groups)
with the two corresponding figures in the second column
(control groups), we see two patterns. First, all of the data
points are either in quadrants 1 or 3 for the treatment
groups, but that is not always the case for the control
groups.12 Second, the spline is upward sloping and in the
predicted quadrants in the SPF treatment group, while we
observe a flat relationship in the control groups. These
results indicate, nonparametrically, that our treatment
groups had a greater prevalence (relative to the control
groups) of sensible updating and suggest that our informa-
tion experiment caused respondents to revise their inflation
expectations.
Parametric analysis of updating behavior. We next
examine updating behavior in a regression framework. We
estimate the slope of a fitted line for the individual-level
data underlying each of the four panels in figure 2, regres-
sing the revision in inflation expectations between stages 1
and 4, Dpi ¼ p0i  pi;, on the perception gap, Dxi. Specifi-
cally, we estimate (separately for the Food and SPF treat-
ments) the following regression,
Dpi ¼ aþ bTinfo;i þ c Tinfo;i  Dxi
 þ 2i; (1)
where Tinfo;i is an indicator that equals 1 if respondent i is in
the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Note that Dpi and Dxi
are, respectively, the same variables that were plotted on
the y-axes and x-axes in figure 2. In this specification, a is a
constant capturing average updating in the control group
(inclusion of this parameter allows us to control for revi-
sions that are attributable to the other questions asked in the
survey as well as the mere act of taking the survey); aþ b
is the average updating for respondents in the treatment
group with a 0 perception gap; and c, our main coefficient
of interest, shows updating behavior with respect to percep-
tion gap size for the treatment group and provides an esti-
mate of the causal effect of our information treatments on
inflation expectations’ revisions. For revisions to be consis-
tent with meaningful expectation updating, as described
above, we expect estimates of gamma to be nonnegative.
We estimate equation (1) using ordinary least squares.
Table 2 presents results from this baseline regression, with
robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Focusing
first on updating in one-year point forecasts for the Food
group (column 1), we see that the estimate of c is not statis-
tically different from 0. That is, the Food perception gap
appears to have no effect on revisions of inflation expecta-
tions. The imprecise estimate of a indicates no significant
revisions in inflation expectations in the control group. The
estimate of b—the parameter that captures the average
10 However, in the Food treatment, we should only expect under(over)-
estimates to lead to upward (downward) updating if respondents perceive
a positive correlation between past food price changes and future inflation
outcomes.
11 In cases where deciles overlap, fewer than 10 points appear on the
plot. Instances of overlapping deciles are indicated by circles that are lar-
ger in size.
12 We also find a greater percentage of nonzero updating respondents in
the shaded quadrants for the treatment groups than for the control groups:
For example, 70% of nonzero updating in the Food treatment group hap-
pens in the shaded quadrants, as compared with 60% for the Food control
and 67.5% for the SPF treatment group as compared with 52.4% for the
SPF control.
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updating attributable to the treatment group that is not
explained by the perception gap (on top of the average
updating of the control group)—is negative but also not sta-
tistically different from 0.
Turning to the SPF forecast information in column 2, we
see that the estimate of c is positive and significant: a 10
percentage point perception gap in the SPF treatment causes
a 3.93 percentage point revision in inflation expectations
(significant at 1%). This estimate implies that an increase in
the SPF treatment perception gap of 1 standard deviation
leads, on average, to a revision that is 48.9% of a standard
deviation of the baseline expectations. As before, the esti-
mate of a is not statistically different from 0. We find that b
is also not different from 0, indicating there is no effect of
the SPF treatment on inflation expectations’ revisions (rela-
tive to control group responses) other than what is
explained by the size of respondents’ perception gap.
We next estimate the baseline specification but use the
revisions in the fitted mean of the one-year density forecasts
(columns 3 and 4 of table 2), and three-year point forecasts
(columns 5 and 6) as our dependent variable. We generally
find the same pattern as we had seen for the one-year point
forecasts: for both one-year density forecasts and three-year
point forecasts, the Food treatment has no meaningful
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impact on expectations revisions. The SPF treatment, how-
ever, significantly affects the revision of the mean of the
year-ahead density forecast. The updating coefficient (of
0.096) is about a quarter of the magnitude of the coefficient
for the updating of the one-year point forecast (reported in
column 2). We revisit this difference between point forecast
and density updating later, in section V. There is a positive
impact of the SPF treatment on updating at the three-year
horizon; however, the estimate of 0.18 is both smaller in
magnitude than its counterpart in column 2 and is not sig-
nificant at conventional levels. A plausible explanation for
the weaker impact on the revision for the three-year point
forecast horizon is that respondents may perceive less of a
pass-through of recent price changes to medium-term infla-
tion (compared to near-term inflation).
In the last two columns of table 2, we explore the rela-
tionship between revision of inflation expectations and
baseline uncertainty about future inflation. In a Bayesian
framework, ceteris paribus, respondents who are more
uncertain about future inflation should be more responsive
to the treatment information. More precisely, for beliefs that


















, that is, responsiveness to information should
be directly proportional to the uncertainty in the prior (i.e., the
baseline uncertainty about future inflation). Using the var-
iance obtained from fitting a beta distribution to each respon-
dent’s one-year baseline density forecast, we define a dummy
variable, Uncertain, that equals 1 if the respondent’s baseline
variance is above the sample median. We add three additional
terms to equation (1): aUUncertaini, bU Tinfo;i  Uncertaini
 
,
and cU Tinfo;i  Dxi  Uncertaini
 
. Similar to the coeffi-
cients a and b in the baseline version of equation (1), the
additional coefficients aU and bU capture the mean updating
behavior for high-uncertainty respondents in the control
group and in the treatment group with a zero perception gap
(relative to low-uncertainty respondents). Meanwhile
cþ cU shows average updating behavior with respect to the
perception gap for high-uncertainty respondents. Theoreti-
cally, the sign of aU and bU is unclear. However, a positive
cU would be consistent with Bayesian updating.
Columns 7 and 8 of table 2 show estimates of this specifi-
cation for the Food and SPF treatments, respectively. In line
with our results in the earlier columns of the table, there is
no significant relationship between the perception gap and
revisions in the Food treatment for either low- or high-uncer-
tainty respondents: estimates of both c and cU in column 7
are not statistically different from 0. However, column 8
shows a significant relationship between the SPF perception
gap and inflation expectations’ revisions for both low- and
high-uncertainty respondents. Notably, the estimate of cU is
four times as large as that of c, indicating substantially
greater responsiveness to information for high-uncertainty
respondents. The estimates imply that a 10 percentage point
perception gap in the SPF treatment causes a 5.5 percentage
point revision for high-uncertainty respondents versus a 1.0
percentage point revision for low-uncertainty respondents.
Meanwhile, the estimates of aU and bU, while not estimated
very precisely, indicate that high-uncertainty respondents in
both the control and treatment groups exhibit larger down-
ward average revisions relative to their counterparts. For
example, we estimate that high-uncertainty respondents in
the food treatment with a perception gap of 0 revise their
TABLE 2.—BASELINE UPDATING REGRESSIONS BY TREATMENT
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FINAL  BASELINE INFLATION EXPECTATIONS

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment Group [b] 0.943 0.390 0.259 0.345 1.513 0.181 0.168 0.163
(0.816) (0.827) (0.360) (0.386) (1.009) (1.014) (0.297) (0.144)
Perception Gap 
Treatment Group [g]a
0.0244 0.393*** 0.0289 0.0955*** 0.0647 0.180 0.0168 0.101***
(0.0898) (0.130) (0.0386) (0.0339) (0.0856) (0.156) (0.0143) (0.0100)











Constant [a] 0.732 0.931 0.240 0.370 0.0244 1.031 0.200 0.251***
(0.524) (0.720) (0.198) (0.336) (0.605) (0.897) (0.260) (0.0929)
R2 0.005 0.209 0.005 0.072 0.025 0.038 0.083 0.330
Number of observations 147 178 141 173 145 176 144 175
OLS estimates of a regression of the revision in inflation expectations on various controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% levels, respectively.
aPerception gap is defined as the (true treatment value  information prior).
bUncertain is a dummy that equals 1 if respondent’s baseline uncertainty (variance of subjective distribution) is above the sample median.
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inflation expectations downward by 4.2 points (i.e., relative
to their low-uncertainty counterparts with a 0 perception gap
in the treatment group). Under the regression’s linearity
assumption, this suggests a sizable effect (albeit, an impre-
cise one) of the treatment other than what is explained by the
size of treated respondents’ perception gaps, for high-uncer-
tainty respondents. Overall, the estimates in the last column
of the table indicate that the updating patterns shown in the
second column are primarily driven by the revisions of high-
uncertainty respondents. The larger estimate of cU (than for
c) is consistent with Bayesian updating.
The result that information about future inflation (SPF
forecasts)—but not information about recent prices for food
and beverages—significantly affects inflation expectations
is notable. It suggests that food and beverage price informa-
tion, at least as we have presented it here, has less relevance
for consumers’ expectations of overall inflation. On the one
hand, this may be because some consumers have limited
understanding of the concept of overall inflation. On the
other hand, given that the share of food and beverages in
the consumer price index (CPI) has been consistently
around 15% in recent years, a rational respondent may be
expected to be less responsive in his or her inflation expec-
tation revisions to perception gaps in the Food treatment
than the SPF treatment. Moreover, unlike SPF forecasts, the
information about food prices concerns price changes over
the past year, which may have more limited relevance for
future food price changes.
Before we move onto the analysis of heterogeneity (in
expectations and revisions), we should note that as shown
in table 1, a substantial proportion of the respondents in the
treatment groups do not revise their expectations. As shown
in the table, while these respondents have, on average,
smaller perception gaps (i.e., the information comes as less
of a surprise to them), for many their perception gaps are
still quite large. For the most part, these ‘‘nonrevisers’’ also
do not revise their density forecasts. If we regress an indica-
tor for nonrevision on treatment dummies and our demo-
graphics of interest, we find that nonrevision is generally
difficult to predict:13 while female respondents are about
15% less likely to be nonrevisers (significant at the 10%
level), we otherwise have no strong predictors for nonrevi-
sion.14 It is possible that some respondents simply found
the treatment information not credible or relevant or
decided not to update their beliefs for some other reason.
It should also be pointed out that the observed revisions are
not driven by respondents in, say, the right tail of the baseline
expectations distribution. Figure 3 shows the distribution of
baseline and final inflation expectations. We see that a non-
trivial proportion of respondents in each of four baseline
groups—the intervals [0,5), [5,10), [10,15), and 15þ—move
to a different group, indicative of revisions originating from
respondents in all parts of the baseline expectations distribu-
tion. A downward shift in the distribution is quite obvious.
Looking at the respondents who report baseline expectations
in, for example, the [5,10) range, we see that 41.7% of them
report final expectations in the same range, but 48.3% of them
report final expectations in the [0,5) range.
The analysis in this section leads to our first result:
 Result 1: Respondents, on average, update their expec-
tations in response to provided information. They do so
sensibly and in a direction consistent with Bayesian
updating, with larger revisions for less informed
respondents and for those with greater baseline uncer-
tainty. However, it is information about current SPF
forecasts, and not about past food and beverage prices,
that leads to significant updating.
IV. Heterogeneity in Expectations, Perception Gaps,
and Updating
In this section, we examine the cross-sectional and demo-
graphic dispersion of inflation expectations. We first study
how this dispersion is related to demographic differences in
ex ante informedness, as measured by perception gaps.
Then we turn to demographic differences in how expecta-
tions respond to new information.
13 Here, we restrict our sample to treatment group respondents who had
perception gaps of greater than 1 percentage point, since this offers a sam-
ple of respondents we could expect to revise their expectations. Regres-
sion results are qualitatively similar if we use a cutoff of 0 percentage
points, or 2 percentage points.
14 We do find some evidence of differences in preferences for sources
of information for the revisers and nonrevisers. Our survey instrument
included the question: ‘‘When trying to come up with your answers to the
question about the rate of inflation/deflation, how much did you think
about the information you received from the following sources?’’ on a 1
to 7 scale. Options included TV/radio; newspapers; Internet; financial
advisers; coworkers; family, friends; and shopping experience. Nonrevi-
sers, relative to revisers, are significantly less likely to report ‘‘family,
friends,’’ and significantly more likely to report ‘‘newspapers’’ as sources
of information for their baseline inflation expectations.
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A. Heterogeneity in Expectations and Perception Gaps
Baseline expectations. In section IIIA, we saw that the
distribution of baseline inflation expectations has consider-
able variance and a right skew: our sample overall has a
mean baseline expectation of 5.57 and a median of 3.00,
with a standard deviation of 6.98. Indeed, whereas median
consumer inflation expectation survey responses generally
track official estimates of realized inflation and sometimes
even outperform professional forecasters (Thomas, 1999;
Ang, Bekaert, & Wei, 2007), average consumer inflation
expectations are systematically higher than realized inflation
(Bryan & Venkatu, 2001a, 2001b; Georganas et al., 2014).
To shed light on this dispersion and heavy right tail, we
next examine heterogeneity in baseline inflation expecta-
tions across several demographic groups: gender, age,
financial literacy, education, and income. Various statistics
for baseline expectations are presented in the top panel of
table 3, with demographics varying across columns. The
table is restricted to respondents in the treatment groups,
since the lower panel of the table analyzes revisions in
expectations as a result of the information. Furthermore, for
ease of exposition, we pool the two information treatments
here, since patterns are otherwise qualitatively similar.
The first row in panel A shows that female, lower-income
(less than $75,000), low-education (less than a four-year
college degree), and low-financial-literacy respondents
report higher baseline inflation expectations.15 For example,
women report a mean baseline inflation expectation of 6.8
percent versus a mean expectation of 4.4 for men (differ-
ence statistically significant at the 1% level). Notably, we
do not see any significant differences by age. The second
row of the table then confirms that these differences in
means coincide with a greater percentage of female, lower-
income, low-education, and low-literacy respondents occu-
pying the (high-expectation) right tail of the expectations
distribution: for example, 45% of female respondents report
inflation expectations of 5% or more, compared to 28% of
male respondents in that range (proportions different at the
1% level, using a chi-squared test). A portion of the var-
iance and skew seen in the overall distribution of expecta-
tions can be accounted for by these differences across basic
demographics.16
That these demographic groups report higher inflation
expectations is not a new result. This pattern has also been
found in the prior literature (Jonung, 1981; Bryan & Ven-
katu, 2001a, 2001b; Lombardelli & Saleheen, 2003; Bruine
de Bruin, van der Klaauw, 2010a). However, what is notable
is that we find similar demographic patterns for informed-
ness about current, inflation-related facts. The next two
rows of the table show the average perception gaps for
the two information treatments. We observe that female,
low-education, low-financial literacy, and low-income
respondents have average perception gaps that are larger in
magnitude. These patterns indicate that the variance and
right skew of inflation expectations may in part be due to a
skewed distribution of perceptions about objective measures
of inflation (and, hence, differences in information sets).
To further study the relationship between baseline expec-
tations and informedness, in figure 4 we use contour plots
to show nonparametric estimates of the joint density of
baseline inflation expectations and perception gaps. This
joint density is markedly different between the two infor-
mation treatments, so we show Food and SPF treatment
groups on separate plots. Three features of these plots
deserve note. First, we see that the correlation between
perception gap and baseline expectations is negative and
particularly strong for the SPF treatment group, illustrating
the relationship between informedness and baseline expec-
tations seen in the demographic analysis of table 3. Second,
however, this relationship is substantially weaker in the
Food treatment group. This is consistent with our general
pattern of null results for the Food treatment in section III.
Here, it is respondents’ Food information priors, rather than
the true Food information, that appear to have limited rele-
vance for respondents’ inflation expectations.
Third, by considering the marginal density along either
the x-axis (baseline expectations) or y-axis (perception
gaps), we again see the dispersion and skew in both quanti-
ties that motivate the analysis. In particular, we see the
prevalence of remarkably large perception gaps. Thirty-
eight percent of respondents expect professional forecasts
of next-year inflation to be 5% or more, while our SPF
benchmark was only 1.96% and had not been as high as 5%
since 1984. Respondents’ overestimates are even larger
when we ask about food and beverage price inflation: 40%
of respondents believe past-year food and beverage price
inflation was 7% or more, while the published measure was
only 1.39% and has not risen as high as 7% since 1981.
Besides the above nonparametric analysis, we also esti-
mate a series of linear regressions to study the patterns we
observed in table 3. Here we again focus on demographic
differences in perception gaps. These regressions have the
advantage of allowing a multivariate analysis and also facil-
itate a concise comparison between the two information






¼ a1 þ a2IFood;i þ a3Ci þ a4 IFood;i  Ci
 þ 2i:
(2)
15 Our survey included a battery of seven numeracy and financial lit-
eracy questions. The numeracy questions were drawn from Lipkus,
Samsa, and Rimer (2001), while the questions about financial literacy
were slightly adapted from Lusardi (2007). We coded a perfect score on
these questions as high financial literacy, which included 34.3% of the
sample. See the online appendix for the questions.
16 However, note that the expectation distribution is also right-skewed
within each demographic group. For example, the mean baseline inflation
expectation for lower-income respondents is 6.4%, while the median is
3.0%. That is, demographics alone cannot explain the skew in the expec-
tations distribution.
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Here, x and xi are, respectively, treatment information
and information priors, as defined in section II; IFood;i is an
indicator for whether the respondent is in the Food group
(either control or treatment); and Ci is an indicator for the
individual’s demographic characteristic (such as a female
dummy). Our dependent variable, log(treatment informa-
tion/information prior) is a measure of the error in respon-
dents’ priors about the treatment information. It always has
the same sign as our linear distance measure of perception
gaps, while also giving the regression coefficients an elasti-
city interpretation.17 Concretely, a1 reflects the average of
logðx=xiÞ in the control and treatment groups for the SPF
forecast; a positive (negative) estimate would indicate
underestimation (overestimation) on average for the SPF
forecast in our sample. Next, a1 þ a2 is the average error
for past food/beverage price changes; a3 is the average dif-
ference in logðx=xiÞ for demographic characteristic C for
the SPF forecast (relative to their counterparts), and
a3 þ a4 is the average difference in the error for the demo-
graphic characteristic C for food prices. So an estimate for
a3 of, say, 0.1 for a given demographic group would indi-
cate a 10% larger overestimate for that group for the SPF
forecast.
Results from estimating equation (2) are shown in appen-
dix table A1 for the same demographics studied in table 3:
gender, age, financial literacy, education, and income. In
the first five columns, we regress the perception gap onto
one demographic variable at a time, while in the last col-
umn of the table, we control for all demographics at once.
In our multivariate analysis in column 6, we see that three
results are statistically significant when we control for all
demographics at once. First, we see that none of the demo-
graphic variables and Food treatment interaction terms is
statistically different from 0, indicating that demographic
differences in perception gaps do not vary systematically
across the two information treatments. Second, we find that
female respondents have 35% and 9% larger perception
gaps (greater overestimation) on average than males in the
SPF and Food treatments, respectively.18 Third, college
respondents have average perception gaps that are 27% and
34% smaller than those of their less-educated peers in the
SPF and Food treatments, respectively. While the remain-
ing coefficients are not statistically significant, estimates in
the last column show patterns similar to those in the first
five columns (and similar to the patterns in table 3). Nota-
bly, the R2 in the last regression of table A1 shows that
demographic characteristics explain up to 27% of the varia-
tion in perception gaps.
Returning to table 3, it is also worth noting that the same
demographic groups (female, low-literacy, low-education,
and lower-income respondents) not only report higher base-
line inflation expectations, but also have more uncertain
baseline inflation expectations. This is shown in the last
row in the top panel of table 3. For example, female respon-
dents have a mean individual density forecast variance of
27.2, while male respondents have an average forecast var-
iance of 10.8 (difference significant at the 10% level).19
Revised expectations. We next move to panel B of table
3, which shows various summary statistics related to final
inflation expectations. The first row in panel B shows larger
average revisions in inflation expectations for the same
demographic groups that we highlighted in panel A (though
the differences by demographics are not always significant).
For example, women revise down their inflation expecta-
tions, on average, by 2.6 percentage points, compared to a
downward revision of 0.7 percentage points for men. As
a result of these different revisions, the table shows that
average inflation expectations converge between gender,
FIGURE 4.—JOINT DENSITY OF BASELINE EXPECTATIONS AND PERCEPTION GAPS
17 For respondents who report a 0 or negative information prior, we
recode their information prior as 0.1 for the sake of calculating log(info/
belief). There are only three such instances.
18 To obtain the average perception gap for female respondents in the
Food treatment, one has to add the coefficients on female and female 
Food treatment (0.345 þ 0.258).
19 Whether this is a consequence of some individuals being aware that
they are relatively underinformed or is related to innate differences in
(over)confidence between demographic groups is an intriguing question
for further work.
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financial literacy, education, and income groups after the
information treatment. Likewise, the disagreement among
respondents, as represented by the standard deviation of the
expectations distribution, falls from 7.3 percentage points
to 4.6 (shown in the final row of table 3). The revised distri-
bution is significantly different from the baseline expecta-
tions distribution for the overall sample, as well as for
female, young, low-literacy, and lower-income respondents
(as indicated by the p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test for the equality of the baseline and revised distribu-
tions, reported in the last row of table 3).20
In fact, table 3 shows that average inflation expectations
for each demographic group converge toward being near, or
within 2 percentage points of, the actual realized CPI infla-
tion between January 2011 and January 2012 (2.93%). Cau-
tion is warranted in using an ex post realized outcome as a
benchmark for accuracy of ex ante expectations, since infla-
tion outcomes are uncertain and respondents’ point fore-
casts may refer to various statistics (i.e., mean, median,
mode, or others) of their subjective probability distributions
(Engelberg et al., 2009). Nevertheless, we find at the base-
line that 39.3% of responses are within 1 percentage point
of ultimately realized CPI inflation, whereas posttreatment,
this percentage improves to 56.6%.
Thus, we see that our information treatments reduce the
variance of the expectations distribution, and in particular
have a strong effect on the demographic groups that tend to
populate the distribution’s thick right tail. While our analy-
sis so far has suggested that demographic differences in
updating may be related to demographic differences in per-
ception gaps, these patterns in updating could also be con-
sistent with demographic differences in baseline uncertainty
about future inflation and/or information processing rules.
These factors are investigated next. The analysis in this sec-
tion leads to our second result:
 Result 2: There is substantial heterogeneity in baseline
inflation expectations, with significantly higher expec-
tations for female, low-financial literacy, low-educa-
tion, and lower-income respondents. The same groups
also, on average, exhibit less ex ante informedness
about the objective information, suggesting that high
inflation expectations may (in part) be a result of
underinformedness about objective, inflation-relevant
information. Finally, as a result of information provi-
sion, the distribution of inflation expectations con-
verges toward its center and toward actual realized CPI
inflation.
B. Heterogeneity in Updating Rules
In the previous section, we saw that the demographic
groups that have larger perception gaps exhibit larger revi-
sions in inflation expectations. However, we also noted that
these groups have greater baseline uncertainty and may dif-
fer in their responsiveness to information (i.e., updating
rules). Madeira and Zafar (2012), for example, find signifi-
cant differences in inflation expectation updating by gender
and other demographic characteristics.21 In this section we
test for such differences and also examine the effects of dif-
ferent levels of uncertainty across demographic groups.
To investigate demographic differences in updating, we
focus on updating at the one-year point forecast horizon.
We estimate updating effects for the same demographic
groups as in table 3: gender, age, financial literacy, educa-
tion, and income. We also use an additional variable, based
on the following question asked immediately after eliciting
final inflation expectations (in stage 4) from the treatment
group: ‘‘To what extent is your answer [to the PP or RI
question] over the next twelve months the same or different
because of the information provided to you [in the Food or
SPF information treatment]?’’ Responses are given on a
seven-point scale (with a higher number indicating a larger
effect of provided information); these responses are coded
such that roughly 40% of respondents are flagged as ‘‘info-
affected’’ (the cutoff for ‘‘info-affected’’ is 5 or more points
out of 7).
For each of the six characteristics discussed above, we
modify equation (1) slightly by adding demographic inter-
actions, and estimate the following regression:
Dpi ¼ a1 þ a2Ci þ b1Tinfo;i þ b2ðTinfo;i  CiÞ
þ c Tinfo;i  Ci  Dxi
 
þ g Tinfo;i  ð1  CiÞ  Dxi
 þ 2i; (3)
where Ci is a binary variable that represents one of the six
individual-level characteristics: gender, age, financial lit-
eracy, education, income, and info-affected. As in equation
(1), Tinfo;i is a dummy that equals 1 if respondent i is in the
treatment group and 0 otherwise. The inclusion of a2 allows
the possibility that the intercept term differs by demo-
graphic group. Also similar to equation (1), the b terms
summed with the a terms capture the average revision (by
demographic group) for treatment group individuals with a
0 perception gap. The parameter c captures the updating
behavior for individuals with the given characteristic Ci,
while g captures updating behavior for individuals without
that characteristic. As before, we estimate equation (3)
separately for the Food treatment and SPF treatment.
We analyze updating one characteristic at a time. While
it would be ideal to test for updating differences by all of
these characteristics simultaneously—for example, gender
differences in updating could partly be a result of gender
differences in income, education, or financial literacy—our
sample size prevents us from exploring these channels. For-
20 Furthermore, we do not find a significant change in disagreement
among respondents in the control group.
21 In other contexts of belief-updating, Mobius et al. (2013) find signifi-
cant gender differences in information processing.
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tunately, the correlation between each of these demographic
variables is small.22
The first two columns of table 4 present the results for
equation (3) by gender for the two information treatments.
As was the case for the full sample, there is no evidence of
significant updating in the Food treatment (estimates of
both c and g are not different from 0). The second column
shows that nearly all significant updating in the case of the
SPF treatment that appears in table 2 is driven by female
respondents (c ¼ 0:404, while the estimate of g is not dif-
ferent from zero; the p-value reported at the bottom of the
column shows that the two estimates are statistically differ-
ent). Our estimate of a2 is not different from 0, suggesting
that men and women (in the control group) respond simi-
larly to the act of taking a survey. Likewise, our estimate of
b2 is not significant, suggesting that both genders have
similar responses to the treatment in the case of having a
zero perception gap. Overall, the second column shows that
even when we condition on perception gap size, female
respondents exhibit greater responsiveness to our treatment
information than male respondents. In our discussion
below, we examine whether this is a result of higher base-
line uncertainty for females, different information proces-
sing, or a combination of both.
Columns 3 to 10 of the table report estimates by age,
financial literacy, education, and income, again separately
for the two information treatments. In contrast to our results
for gender, here we find that all demographic subgroups
update significantly and sensibly in the SPF treatment. (The
one exception is our estimate of c for high-financial-literacy
respondents in column 6, which is sensible and relatively
large but not significant.) For example, in column 10, we
estimate that both high-income and low-income respon-
dents update significantly: in response to a 1 standard devia-
tion increase in the SPF forecast perception gap, the two
groups revise their expectations by 59.4% and 44.9% of a
standard deviation of baseline inflation expectations,
respectively. Likewise in contrast to our results by gender,
the SPF treatment reveals no significant differences in
updating behavior between age, financial literacy, educa-
tion, and income subgroups. For example, again consider-
ing column 10, we cannot reject the null of no difference in
updating behavior by income (p-value ¼ 0.38). Mean-
while, we see that these demographic groups’ response to
the Food treatment is consistent with our results for the full
sample (in table 2) in that we find little evidence of signifi-
cant updating. Furthermore, consistent with our results by
gender in columns 1 and 2, we generally find no significant
differences in Food treatment updating behavior between
groups. The one exception is a difference in Food treatment









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22 The highest correlation that we observe is 0.29, between high income
and college. Female and financial literacy has a correlation of 0.13, high
financial literacy and college education has a correlation of 0.13, and
female and high income has a correlation of 0.10. All other correlations
are smaller than 0.1 in magnitude.
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is marginally significant at the 10% level and positive (and
statistically different from the estimate of g), indicating
that college-educated individuals respond to the errors in
their food perception gaps when revising their inflation
expectations.
Finally, the last two columns of the table present esti-
mates of the specification with the info-affected characteris-
tic. If individuals in the information treatments are indeed
changing their inflation expectations in response to the pro-
vided information, we expect to see stronger updating
among respondents who report that the provided informa-
tion ‘‘affected’’ their final expectations. That is what we see
in the last column of the table, where the estimate of
responsiveness to information among info-affected respon-
dents (g) is almost twice as large as that of their counter-
parts (though the estimates are not statistically different).
This result is a consistency check in support of our baseline
model, in which updating is a function of the information
provided. It also, together with the frequent differences in
response to the Food and SPF information treatments, indi-
cates that respondents are processing the treatment informa-
tion thoughtfully rather than unconsciously anchoring to the
new information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A pure
anchoring explanation would suggest that respondents
would (a) report revised inflation expectations that are clo-
ser to the numbers provided to them in the information
treatments—which is inconsistent with the differential
effects in the Food and SPF treatments and (b) be unaware
of the treatments’ effects on their responses—which is
inconsistent with our info-affected results.
Overall, two things are of note in table 4. First, the only
marginally significant impact of the Food treatment on infla-
tion expectations in table 4 is observed for college-educated
respondents. For other demographic groups, there is no sig-
nificant pass-through of new information about food price
changes onto inflation expectations.23 Second, the only evi-
dence of heterogeneous response to perception gaps in the
SPF treatment is observed by gender. (It is the case that the
estimates for higher-income, college-educated, and older
respondents are larger than those of their counterparts, but
none of those differences is statistically significant.) That is,
female respondents are more responsive to information than
men are, even after we control for the size of perception
gaps. These results suggest that men and women use differ-
ent information-processing rules or that women are more
uncertain than men about future inflation expectations at the
baseline (of which we do present evidence in table 3).24 In
appendix table A2, we control for baseline uncertainty by
augmenting equation (3) with the same terms we used in our
analysis of uncertainty in table 2, Uncertaini, Tinfo;i

UncertainiÞ, and Tinfo;i  Dxi  Uncertaini
 
, plus their
interactions with gender. Even controlling for the effects of
uncertainty (which are allowed to differ by gender), our con-
clusion that the response to the SPF treatment is driven by
female respondents holds. While previous research on gen-
der differences in inflation expectations updating has found
mixed results,25 our analysis suggests that gender differ-
ences in information-processing rules likely play an impor-
tant role.
This leads to our third and final result:
 Result 3: Women are on average more responsive to
our SPF information treatment relative to men (even
after controlling for baseline uncertainty and percep-
tion gaps), highlighting the potential importance of
allowing for heterogeneous information-processing
rules.
V. Discussion
In this section we discuss the implications of our results
for the modeling of consumer inflation expectations. Our
primary conclusion is that our results help provide a micro-
foundation for models in which agents form expectations
rationally but face information constraints (Sims, 2003;
Reis, 2006a, 2006b; Mac´kowiak & Wiederholt, 2009). We
also highlight possible enrichments to these models that in
light of our results might parsimoniously improve both rea-
lism and performance.
A. Rational Models with Limited Information
Our result 1 suggests that several features of respondents’
updating behavior when faced with new information are
consistent with rational, Bayesian updating: (a) the sys-
tematic and meaningful relationship between expectations
updating and both the size and direction of perception gaps;
(b) the stronger effect of new information among respon-
dents who have greater uncertainty at baseline; and (c) the
self-awareness that individuals report for whether the infor-
mation treatments ‘‘affected’’ their expectations. Our con-
clusion is consistent with Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s
(2012a) analysis of SPF panel data, which finds that the
systematic errors in SPF inflation forecasts are consistent
with expectations being formed rationally—albeit subject
to information constraints.26 However, while these findings
are consistent with Bayesian updating, they are not a
23 However, in a hard-to-interpret result, column (5) shows that low-
literacy respondents in the treatment group exhibit a downward shift, on
average, in their revised inflation expectations that is unrelated with
their perception gap (i.e., the estimate of b1 is statistically significant
and negative).
24 Our findings may also be consistent with the economics and psychol-
ogy literature that finds that men are more (over)confident than women
(Barber & Odean, 2001; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). These studies
imply that controlling for the information content of the signal, men
respond less to information.
25 Burke and Manz (2014) do not find significant differences by gender
in information processing, but Madeira and Zafar (2011) find significant
differences in expectation updating by gender and other demographic
characteristics.
26 See also Andrade and LeBihan (2013) and Dra¨ger and Lamla (2013),
with analyses and results similar to those in Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2012a).
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wholesale confirmation of rationality or pure Bayesian
updating.27
Second, result 2 highlights the importance of information
constraints in explaining both the evolution of and the
cross-sectional distribution of inflation expectations. In the
literature, these constraints have variously been modeled as
the result of noisy private signals (Woodford, 2001) or a
limited capacity for information transmission (Sims, 2003),
generally referred to as a noisy information model, or as the
result of some type of sticky information due to either slow
information diffusion (Mankiw & Reis, 2002) or stochastic
updating of information (Carroll, 2003), or a private cost of
information acquisition (Reis, 2006a, 2006b).28
We view our microevidence as a helpful benchmark in
choosing among these options for modeling information
constraints. In particular, our finding that cross-sectional
disagreement (variance) in expectations falls after our infor-
mation treatments is more consistent with a sticky informa-
tion model than a noisy information model. As Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2012b) demonstrate, a noisy information
model predicts constant disagreement in inflation expecta-
tions over time under fairly general conditions;29 these con-
ditions should hold in our setting so long as our information
treatments are perceived with individual-level noise (as in
Woodford, 2001). On the other hand, a sticky information
model predicts that disagreement can rise and fall depend-
ing on the size of inflation shocks. Indeed, so long as our
information treatment sends a signal that is sufficiently
similar to other recent information about inflation, a sticky
information model would predict that the new information
reduces the cross-sectional variance of expectations, consis-
tent with our findings. Especially in light of Mankiw et al.’s
(2003) results that disagreement in inflation expectations
co-moves with other macroeconomic aggregates, these pat-
terns in disagreement may be important for well-performing
models to replicate. Meanwhile, our observation that some
individuals do not update their expectations at all, even
when facing large perception gaps, also is more consistent
with sticky information than noisy information. Among
sticky information models, our evidence of significant
updating in the SPF treatment provides some direct evi-
dence for Carroll’s (2003) model in which consumers peri-
odically update their expectations based on the forecasts of
experts. Our experimental setup is, however, unable to iden-
tify the reasons that expectations may be sticky. Distin-
guishing between possible explanations, such as stochastic
updating or private cost of information acquisition, would
require a longer panel of beliefs and a richer experimental
setup that varies other dimensions such as the cost of
acquiring information.
Caution is also warranted in using our results to calibrate
a model of inflation expectation formation, since in our
setup, respondents do not choose the type of information
they receive. Belief updating when individuals are directly
presented with new information may differ from instances
where individuals acquire the information themselves
(Hertwig et al., 2004). Also, we do not wish to make
assumptions about how our information treatments interact
with individuals’ broader, inflation-relevant information
sets, which would be necessary in order to estimate a para-
meter such as Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2012a) mea-
sure of information rigidity.
Our third result of gender differences in information pro-
cessing is also not inconsistent with a limited-information,
rational-expectations model of inflation expectation forma-
tion. Gender differences in updating behavior may indicate
gender differences in gathering and evaluating new infor-
mation. While a full analysis of gender-specific expectation
formation is beyond the scope of this paper, our survey
included some additional questions that may shed light on
this point. First, we find that female respondents are signifi-
cantly (at the 1% level) more likely than male respondents
to answer that they ‘‘thought a lot about . . . the price of gro-
ceries’’ when initially reporting their inflation expectations,
which suggests that they weight types of information differ-
ently than men do. We also find that female respondents are
significantly (at the 1% level) more likely to ‘‘think about the
information [they] received from . . . family and friends’’
when reporting inflation expectations than male respondents
are. On the other hand, we find no significant gender differ-
ence in preference for some other information sources, such
as ‘‘shopping experience,’’ ‘‘TV and radio,’’ or ‘‘newspapers
and magazines.’’ This suggests that women on average
gather inflation-relevant information and weight this infor-
mation somewhat differently than men do. So whereas these
demographic differences do not necessarily indicate devia-
tions from rationality, macroeconomists should decide in
their particular modeling circumstances whether (potentially
large) heterogeneity in expectation formation is important to
consider and, if so, allow for idiosyncratic private informa-
tion in their models. This finding partially validates recent
modeling work that explains heterogeneous consumer infla-
tion expectations through heterogeneous information sets
and different updating rules (Malmendier & Nagel, 2016;
Madeira & Zafar, 2012).
B. Forecasting under Asymmetric Loss
Finally, our analysis points to one other important con-
sideration in modeling inflation expectations. When cali-
brating models to survey data in which respondents report
27 Our results, however, are a clear rejection of full-information rational
expectations (FIRE) for the average respondent. In a FIRE framework, all
information publicly known at the time of the forecast should already be
incorporated in the forecasts, and hence our information experiment
(which provides publicly available information) should have had no sys-
tematic effect on individuals’ forecasts.
28 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012a) also show how noisy informa-
tion and sticky information models can be unified in a useful framework
of information rigidities.
29 This holds for additive i.i.d. noise in private signals and for AR infla-
tion (of any order). See also Andrade and LeBihan (2013) for a useful
summary of these results.
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point predictions, researchers typically need to make
assumptions about which summary statistic a respondent is
reporting from her subjective probability distribution of
future outcomes. Whereas it is common to assume the mean
is being reported, implying that respondents generate fore-
casts under symmetric square loss, Capistran and Timmer-
mann (2009) point out that an individual’s reported expec-
tation is biased away from the mean if she forecasts using
an asymmetric loss function. Capistran and Timmermann
argue that asymmetric loss may be important in accounting
for the cross-sectional heterogeneity of inflation expecta-
tions. Also, asymmetric loss generates a mean bias that var-
ies in size with the uncertainty of individual expectations,
and hence is likely nonconstant over time.30
Since we gather both point forecast and density forecast
expectations from all respondents, we can test if respon-
dents provide a point forecast under symmetric square loss.
To motivate our tests, we follow Elliott, Komunjer, and
Timmermann (2008) and suppose that respondents’ point
forecasts minimize the expectation of a loss function L ð Þ,
and we transform L ð Þ’s argument using a function that
reflects possible loss aversion, /ðÞ. That is, we suppose




Lð/ a  ~pð ÞÞdFð~pÞ (4)
where F ð Þ is a subjective probability distribution over
future inflation outcomes ~p. We consider the relatively gen-
eral case where L xð Þ  xj jp for some p > 0, and where
/ xð Þ is parameterized as
/ xð Þ  bx x < 0
x x  0

(5)
for some b > 0. Symmetric square loss implies p ¼ 2 and
b ¼ 1.
Under symmetric square loss, any deviation of the point
forecast from the density mean should be purely noise and
hence be symmetric around the density mean. We present
two tests for symmetric square loss. The first test, the most
natural one, compares point forecasts with density means.
Under symmetric square loss, any deviations of the point
forecast from the density mean should be purely noise and
hence be symmetric around the density mean. For the sec-
ond test, we compare revisions in point forecasts with revi-
sions in density means. In developing our tests, we assume
that respondents report their true F ð Þ through their density
forecasts.
For our first test, we find that individuals’ point forecasts
are on average 1.46 percentage points higher than their den-
sity means at baseline (and revised point forecasts are on
average 0.51 percentage points higher than revised density
means). However, we also see that an approximately equal
number of respondents have point forecasts above and
below their density mean at both the baseline and final
stages; for example, baseline point forecasts are above
baseline density forecasts for 49.8% of respondents and
below for 47.3% of respondents.31 Hence, we see that a
simple comparison of point forecasts with density means
provides only modest evidence against the square sym-
metric loss hypothesis.
We provide stronger evidence against symmetric square
loss when we compare revisions in point forecasts with
revisions in density forecasts. Our approach here is to
regress respondents’ point forecast revisions (Dp) onto the
revisions of the fitted means of their density forecasts (the
density revision). Under symmetric square loss, we would
expect the coefficient on density revision to be 1. Second,
we augment this regression with another regressor, changes
in respondents’ density uncertainty (denoted as DU and
measured as the change in the respondent’s fitted density
variance). We would expect the coefficient on DU to be 0
under symmetric square loss.
The first two columns of table 5 present our estimates for
these two specifications. In column 1, we see that the esti-
mated coefficient on density revision is 0.811; the estimate
is, however, not statistically different from 1 at conven-
tional levels.32 However, when we extend this test by add-
ing DU as a regressor, we can see in column 2 that the esti-
mated coefficient on DU is statistically different from 0 at
the 1% level and a joint test of the first coefficient being
equal to 1 together with the coefficient on DU being equal
TABLE 5.—TESTING FOR SYMMETRIC SQUARE/ABSOLUTE LOSS FUNCTIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FINAL  BASELINE INFLATION EXPECTATIONS











Constant 0.891*** 0.662*** 0.881*** 0.596***
(0.238) (0.209) (0.234) (0.209)
R2 0.169 0.213 0.185 0.244
Number of
observations
314 314 314 314
OLS estimates of a regression of the revision in inflation expectations on various controls. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
aDefined as final fitted density varaince minus baseline fitted density variance.
30 See Bruine de Bruin, Manski, et al. (2011) for evidence of substantial
time series variation in consumer uncertainty about expected inflation.
31 If we focus on larger gaps between point forecasts and density means,
which may help remove some noise, we see that 27.0% of respondents
have baseline point forecasts that are more than 1 percentage point above
their density means, whereas only 21.0% of respondents have baseline
point forecasts that are more than 1 percentage point below their density
means. In contrast, Engelberg et al. (2009), in their analysis of the point
forecast and density means and medians of professional forecasters, find
that most point forecasts are within a narrow band around the density
means or medians. However, conditional on being outside the band, they
find that point predictions are much more often below the lower bounds
than above the upper ones.
32 We note, however, that if we include PP respondents in this regres-
sion to increase statistical power, then we strongly reject that the coeffi-
cient equals 1 (p-value ¼ 0.000).
520 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
to 0 is rejected at the 5% level. Both results reject sym-
metric square loss in updating.
The empirical facts that average point forecasts are above
density means and that the coefficient on DU is greater than
0 suggest that respondents deviate from symmetric square
loss in a manner consistent with the alternative, b > 1. That
is, respondents appear to be averse to underestimating infla-
tion. For example, if b > 1, then the right tail of the subjec-
tive probability distribution receives more weight, which
pushes point forecasts above density means. Likewise,
because average revisions are downward in our sample, the
positive coefficient on DU indicates that revisions are smal-
ler (less negative) for respondents with larger increases (or
smaller decreases) in uncertainty; this again is predicted by
b > 1. As Elliott et al. (2008) suggested, such weights may
be the result of prospect-theoretic loss aversion if indivi-
duals view higher-than-expected inflation as a ‘‘bad.’’ We
find some evidence in favor of this interpretation by study-
ing respondents’ answers to free-response questions that we
asked on why respondents did or did not update. One
respondent, for example, described his forecast as a ‘‘safe,
conservative number’’ (emphasis added), and another men-
tioned that higher inflation outcomes are ‘‘worse’’ outcomes.
Of course, there are some subjective distributions FðÞ
for which the above evidence is also consistent with the
alternative p 6¼ 2 and b ¼ 1. For example, if p ¼ 1 and
b ¼ 1 (i.e., symmetric absolute loss, such that point fore-
casts are the medians of respondents’ subjective distribu-
tions) and if the average FðÞ is left-skewed, then we should
also expect that average point forecasts are above density
means. While a full examination of various alternatives to
square symmetric loss is beyond the scope of this paper, we
can easily test the symmetric absolute loss alternative by
comparing point forecasts with density medians. As was the
case with the comparison with density means, individuals’
point forecasts are on average above the density medians
(more specifically, 1.52 percentage points higher than den-
sity medians at baseline and 0.54 percentage points higher
than density medians after the treatment). We can also test
for symmetric absolute loss in the framework of table 5 if
we use density medians as regressors in place of density
means. These analyses are presented in columns 3 and 4 of
the table and provide further evidence against symmetric
absolute loss. We again see that the coefficient on density
median is different from 1 and that the coefficient on DU is
greater than 0.33 These results are inconsistent with the joint
hypothesis that p ¼ 1 and b ¼ 1 and again are consistent
with b > 1.
Overall, we interpret the results in this section as sugges-
tive evidence of forecasting and updating under asymmetric
loss on the part of our survey respondents. This implies that
measuring—and accounting for—individuals’ uncertainty
may be crucial when calibrating models to survey data,
especially if there is reason to believe that individuals’
uncertainty may be changing over time.
VI. Conclusion
A crucial aspect of monetary policy is managing inflation
expectations. However, there is limited understanding of
how individuals form these expectations, a primary ques-
tion for economists and policymakers. This paper, using a
survey with an embedded information experiment, attempts
to shed light on this question by exploring the causal deter-
minants of inflation expectations. We find that respondents,
on average, are not fully informed about past as well as
future inflation-relevant measures, and when they are pro-
vided with certain kinds of inflation-relevant information,
they update their inflation expectations. Moreover, the
updating is meaningful in the sense that, on average, it is in
the direction of the signal, proportional to the strength of
the signal (i.e., the revealed perception gap), and greater
when the baseline expectations are more uncertain. Our
results are consistent with models in which agents form
expectations rationally but face information constraints.
As a result of the information treatments, the inflation
expectations distribution converges toward its center, and
there is a significant decline in the cross-sectional variance
of the expectations distribution. An immediate implication
of this result is that information campaigns might be effec-
tively deployed as part of prudent monetary policy to affect
consumer inflation expectations. In particular, our results
suggest that the (high-expectation) right tail of the distribu-
tion of public inflation expectations, consisting dispropor-
tionately of expectations from female, low-financial lit-
eracy, lower-education, and lower-income individuals,
could be influenced and managed with public information
campaigns, assuming one can find an effective way to deli-
ver the information.
Another notable and arguably encouraging finding is that
(information about) price changes in food and beverages
has limited pass-through to consumers’ inflation expecta-
tions. A positive interpretation of this finding is that our sur-
vey respondents understand that the Food treatment pro-
vides information about past price changes in only part of a
consumption basket, while the SPF treatment provides
information in the same time frame for which we elicit
respondents’ expectations (next year) and provides informa-
tion about price changes in a whole consumption basket.
That would be an encouraging finding for policy institutions
and central banks that monitor consumer inflation expecta-
tions closely, since it indicates that consumers’ inflation
expectations, as we measure here, are not susceptible to
price changes in food and beverages, which generally tend
to be volatile. A less favorable interpretation could be that
our survey respondents either have a limited understanding
of the concept of overall inflation (and hence do not under-
stand the link between food prices and overall inflation) or
33 In column 4, a joint test of the first coefficient being equal to 1
together with the coefficient on DU being equal to 0 is rejected at the 1%
level.
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do not find the objective information about the small food
price increases prevalent during the study period to be cred-
ible. Additionally, it is possible that respondents would
update more substantially in circumstances where they
learned they had underestimated food price inflation; in our
setting, 94% of Food perception gaps were overestimates.34
While we have shown that respondents revise their infla-
tion expectations sensibly in response to the provided infor-
mation, we are unable to analyze whether the magnitude of
their revisions is either an under- or overreaction to the pro-
vided information. For example, without knowing the per-
ceived effect of past food and beverage price changes on
future inflation, we cannot evaluate whether respondents
should update their inflation expectations more or less than
we observe in response to the Food information treatment.
Furthermore, in our study, respondents do not choose the
type of information but are exogenously provided with a
treatment. Observed heterogeneity in inflation expectations
may partly arise because of demographic differences in
information acquisition (Burke & Manz, 2014; Mobius
et al., 2013). Moreover, belief updating when presented
with new information in a survey or experiment may be
very different from instances where individuals acquire the
information themselves (Hertwig et al., 2004). Likewise,
the long-term effects of new information on respondents’
expectations are also unclear. Finally, while we find that
expectations formation in our context is consistent with a
sticky information model, we cannot identify the sources of
stickiness (such as information costs or stochastic updating)
in the current framework. Each of these areas requires
further research.35
Finally, providing information to respondents does not
necessarily guarantee more accurate expectations. Whereas
we do find in our experimental setting that revised expecta-
tions converge toward the range of recent years’ inflation
realizations (and indeed the actual realized CPI inflation
between January 2011 and January 2012), information can
have different effects in other contexts. Sometimes indivi-
duals presented with new information that is inconsistent
with a prior belief may be less likely to revise their beliefs
and may even develop more polarized beliefs (Lord, Ross,
& Lepper, 1979; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006). Therefore,
any public information campaigns to help anchor consumer
inflation expectations need to be carefully designed.
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